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BACKGROUND
A cognitive bias often reported for schizophrenia is the tendency to make 
decisions based on little evidence, namely the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias.
The beads task (Huq et al., 1988) is the most commonly used task to investigate 
the JTC and different attempts were made to explain the JTC. One proposition is 
that patients might miscomprehend the task and assume volatility, i.e. a change 
of the task environment, where there is none (Balzan et al., 2012). 
In our task we explicitly stated volatility, i.e. the environment may change.
We tested patients with schizophrenia, autism diagnosis disorder and healthy
controls.
It has been demonstrated that when making decisions in volatile environments 
humans follow Bayesian rules (Nassar et al., 2010).
We thus base our analysis on a Bayesian approach to identify the contribution
of expected and unexpected uncertainty on an agent’s behaviour.
Participants tested so far:
N = 26 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (SCZ), 
N = 16 persons diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders (ASD), and 
N = 42 healthy controls
SAMPLE
Patients with schizophrenia and persons with an ASD show a higher JTC bias than 
the healthy control group, especially in the first trial and with a notably larger 
variance. This JTC bias is mostly due to overweighting the current evidence and 
might be influenced by an overestimation of the stated volatility. The bias 
decreases over the five trials - suggesting learning through feedback.
A high JTC bias seems to be related to a high need for closure (NFC) in patients 
with schizophrenia, potentially explaining the JTC as a result of coping with averse 
uncertainty. 
The IBO analysis suggests that patients overestimate the stated volatility, i.e. the 
probability for the environment to change. Our data indicates thus a too strong 
awareness rather than ignorance of volatility in patients. Further analysis, including 





CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE PLANS
Fig. 1 Beads task
A) Shown are two bags which contain either 80 black and 20 white beads, or 
the reverse. Beads are drawn sequentially with replacement.
B) & C) Each of the 5 trials has 20 draws, and the result of each draw, i.e. the 
color of the bead is shown. The bag of origin is unbeknownst to the 
participants. The participants’ task is, within 10 seconds, to estimate a 
probability for the beads being drawn from either the bag with more black or 
more white beads. They do so by dragging the marker on a visual scale either 
to the left or the right side. 
D) At the end of each trial feedback on the actual bag of origin of the beads is 
provided. 
This project is part of a larger ongoing study on cognitive biases. 
Here, we administered a version of the beads task that requests the participants 
to indicate the probability of the bead coming from bag A or B. 
We induced volatility by informing the participants that the jars can change in ca. 
50% of all trials. 
We developed two mathematical models of an Ideal Bayesian observer (IBO) – one 
that incorporated this as a fixed probability value of the volatility, and one that let 
this probability vary freely (Pfuhl et al., 2015) – and compared them with the 
participants’ responses.
Thanks to all the participants of this study and to the students Mari Arnesen, Kristin Sandvik and Jonas Kymre (all NTNU) who have contributed to the data acquisition.




Fig. 2 JTC bias is the ratio of “jumps” (crossing 
the 0.5 mark on the visual scale in favor of one 
bag to the other after seeing a change in color 
between current and prior bead) to color 
changes per trial. Group means are displayed 
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Fig. 4 & 5 Absolute differences between the participants' and the IBO's probability 
ratings per bead, averaged over number of beads for each trial. Results are displayed 
for both IBO models.
Fig. 3 JTC bias plotted against the Need 
for Closure (NFC) total score per group.
We mapped the participants’ “need for closure” (NFC), or “a motivated need for 
certainty” (McKay et al., 2006) with the Short Need for Closure scale (SNFC; 
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Fig. 6 Overall deviation from the two
IBO models
Model 1: probability value for the 
bags to change can vary (i.e. bigger 
or smaller than described in the 
instruction).
Model 2: incorporates the stated 
probability value for the bag to 
change (i.e. bag change in 50% of all 
trials).
